This paper explores the impact of investor sentiment on the risk-neutral skewness of S&P 500 index options over the period 1990 to 2011. We decompose the aggregate investor sentiment into an economic fundamentals component that captures investors' rational updating of beliefs and an error in beliefs component that captures investors' expectations not associated with the economic conditions. Our …ndings reveal a tale of two periods: before June 1997 both the sentiment components a¤ect risk-neutral skewness, while after June 1997 only the fundamentals component is able to explain risk-neutral skewness. Furthermore, the e¤ect of the fundamentals is more pronounced in periods of worsened stock market conditions. By estimating di¤erent measures of the slope of the implied volatility smirk, we show that the slope of the calls'implied volatility smirk is driven by investors' expectations about a continuation of recent economic conditions, while the slope of the puts'implied volatility smirk is driven by investors'expectations about a reversal in the economy. Overall, our results highlight the importance of economic fundamentals for explaining the variations in option prices and the pricing kernel.
Introduction
The index options implied volatility smirk constitutes evidence of a pronounced negative skewness in the risk-neutral distribution of the index returns. Under the representativeinvestor paradigm, consumption-based asset pricing theory accounts for the variation in risk-neutral skewness by describing the determinants of the pricing kernel. In particular, it suggests that when investors are pessimistic (optimistic) about future consumption, their marginal utility is high (low). Consequently, when investors are bearish (bullish) about the market, they drive up (down) the prices of Arrow-Debreu securities that pay o¤ when the index level is low. This is equivalent to a more (less) negatively sloped pricing kernel, and assuming that the conditional physical probability distribution is always approximately symmetric (Ait-Sahalia et al., 2001 and Rosenberg and Engle, 2002) , it implies a more (less) negative risk-neutral skewness. Shefrin (2005) postulates that the pricing kernel can be decomposed into two parts: one that is driven by investors'erroneous beliefs and a second part that is driven by investors' rational expectations about future consumption. In this vein, Han (2008) shows that the S&P 500 index risk-neutral skewness is strongly a¤ected by investor sentiment. 1 In this paper, we examine how investor sentiment related to economic fundamentals and investors'erroneous beliefs impacts the risk-neutral skewness of index returns. Han (2008) assumes that investor sentiment re ‡ects only investors'unjusti…ed expectations and calls for further research that will extend the rational representative-agent perfect market paradigm to incorporate investors'irrationality. 2 However, prior literature acknowledges that investor sentiment is not purely driven by erroneous beliefs but also incorporates rational updating 1 The related literature also attributes the negative risk-neutral skewness of index returns distribution to factors such as momentum (Amin et al., 2004) , limits to arbitrage (Bollen and Whaley, 2004) , heterogeneous beliefs (Buraschi and Jiltsov, 2006) and market default risk (Andreou, 2013) . See also Pena et al. (1999) and Chang et al. (2009) for empirical investigations of index options markets outside the US. Dennis and Mayhew (2002) , Duan and Wei (2009) and Friesen et al. (2012) explore the determinants of the risk-neutral moments extracted from individual stock options. 2 His assumption is reinforced by the fact that the main results of his study do not change after controlling for four popular macroeconomic indicators. of beliefs. For example, Brown and Cli¤ (2005, p. 417) note that "when people say they are bullish on the market, this can be a rational re ‡ection of prosperous times to come, an irrational hope for the future, or some combination of the two". 3 Hence, we decompose aggregate investor sentiment into two components: an economic fundamentals (EF) component, which corresponds to investors'rational updating of beliefs regarding future market returns due to changes in economic conditions, and an error in beliefs (EB) component, which captures investors'expectations not associated with the economic conditions (expressed in the form of unjusti…ed optimism or pessimism). We examine in this way whether the previously documented relationship between aggregate investor sentiment and risk-neutral skewness is driven by the economic fundamentals or the error in beliefs component. In this respect, this paper contributes to the ongoing research on the impact of behavioral biases on index option prices.
For the empirical analysis we use options on the S&P 500 index and extract risk-neutral The empirical results show that in the …rst sample period (before June 1997), there exists a signi…cantly positive relationship between aggregate investor sentiment and skewness. This means that a more bullish (bearish) aggregate investor sentiment leads to a less (more) negative risk-neutral skewness. Hence this result corroborates the …ndings of Han (2008) .
However, after June 1997, we see that this pattern changes and none of the three aggregate sentiment proxies exhibits any signi…cant relationship with the skewness of the S&P 500 index risk-neutral density. Our …ndings indicate that the impact of aggregate investor sentiment on the risk-neutral skewness is insigni…cant following June 1997. It is important to note, that aggregate sentiment encompasses information from both sentiment components and hence its relationship with risk-neutral skewness can stem from the EF component, the EB component or the combination of both.
Therefore, to shed further light on the relationship between investor sentiment and the S&P 500 index risk-neutral skewness, we repeat our analysis for the components of aggregate sentiment, EF and EB. The results of the …rst period show that although the previously reported relationship between aggregate investor sentiment and risk-neutral skewness is mainly driven by the EF component, the EB component also exhibits some explanatory power. This …nding supports Han's conjecture that before June 1997 the S&P 500 index risk-neutral skewness changes due to the variation in investors'erroneous beliefs. However, the results for the second period provide a striking contrast: the EF component remains strongly signi…cant, while the respective EB component is consistently insigni…cant. Moreover, the results imply that the risk-neutral skewness is in ‡uenced by investors'expectations about a reversal of recent economic conditions. Overall, the empirical evidence regarding the second period suggests that aggregate sentiment constitutes a noisy aggregation of the EF and EB components and that the S&P 500 index options market appears to have become more mature over time.
We further examine the market conditions under which the relation found in the second period between the EF sentiment component and the risk-neutral skewness is more pronounced. Our analysis suggests that this signi…cant relation mainly stems from periods of worsened stock market conditions, a …nding which implies that, on average, the S&P 500 index options investors react asymmetrically to economic fundamentals. In particular, they trade in a way that induces the risk-neutral skewness to become less negative during periods of bad market conditions, while it does not induce it to become more negative during periods of good market conditions. We validate this …nding by examining whether the signi…cant relation for the EF component of each sentiment proxy is mainly driven by periods of more bullish or bearish expectations, depending on the way each proxy responds to recent economic conditions.
Finally, motivated by Constantinides et al.'s (2011) assertion that the index options market is segmented, in the sense that out-of-the-money puts are mainly traded by hedgers while out-of-the-money calls are mainly traded by speculators, we create di¤erent slope measures for calls and puts. The analysis suggests that the slope of the calls' implied volatility smirk is mainly driven by investors' expectations about a continuation of recent economic conditions, while the slope of the puts' implied volatility smirk is mainly driven by investors'expectations about a reversal in the economy. In contrast, the EB component of all sentiment proxies has no explanatory power either for the slope measures from call options or for the slope measure from put options. The above evidence is consistent with that of Constantinides et al. (2011) and implies that the demand for call and the demand for put options originate from investors'di¤erent reactions to economic fundamentals.
Our …ndings have major implications for the asset pricing literature. In particular, we document that aggregate investor sentiment has an important component that represents investors'rational updating of beliefs, the impact of which cannot be ignored on asset prices.
In fact, in the S&P 500 index options market, the pricing kernel is mainly driven by its economic fundamentals component and not by the errors in beliefs component. This …nding is of remarkable importance as the index options market provides us with unique forwardlooking information about the pricing kernel. Moreover, in contrast to Han (2008) , our results suggest that incorporating investors' irrationality into sophisticated option pricing models is no longer valuable. 4 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the construction of the variables used in the study. Section 3 provides the empirical results.
Finally, Section 4 concludes. K is the strike price of the option and S is the index level. The formulas used for the skewness calculation are provided in Appendix A.
The main issue regarding the implementation of the method is that it requires a contin-uum of option prices while the available data is discrete. Therefore, following Chang et al.
(2013) and Neumann and Skiadopoulos (2013), for each cross-section of options we interpolate implied volatilities into the range of available options data using a smoothing cubic spline and extrapolate outside this range using the respective boundary values. Our …nal goal is to obtain a set of 1000 implied volatilities covering the moneyness range from 0.0001 to 3. The implied volatility data points for moneyness < 1 are then converted into put prices and those for moneyness > 1 are converted into call prices. Finally, the trapezoidal approximation is used to calculate the integrals in the BKM formulas. Following this procedure, we calculate the risk-neutral skewness for the two time horizons that are nearest to one month, and then linearly interpolate to …nd the risk-neutral skewness for exactly one-month ahead. skewness from January 1990 to June 2011. We observe that the risk-neutral skewness is negative throughout the sample period and ‡uctuates substantially from month to month. It is notable that the level of the risk-neutral skewness increases during the period of the recent …nancial crisis, a phenomenon that has also been discussed by Birru and Figlewski (2011) . As reported in Table 1 , its sample mean is -1.559 and its autocorrelation coe¢ cient 0.547.
Sentiment Measures
The …rst aggregate investor sentiment proxy comes from Investors Intelligence's advisors' sentiment index. In particular, Investors Intelligence performs a weekly survey of more than 120 independent …nancial market newsletter writers. Each newsletter is categorized as bullish, bearish or correction, based on the expectations of future market movements.
The survey started as monthly in 1963, became fortnightly until June 1969 and since then has been weekly. It is published every Wednesday but the historical data are matched with
Friday dates since the majority of the newsletters are written after the markets close each funds. The last three categories constitute the overall equity funds category. 5 The sentiment proxy is calculated as the "exchanges in" minus the "exchanges out" of the equity funds, normalized by the fund assets at the beginning of each month (Flow-Sent). Intuitively, higher sentiment leads investors to alter their asset allocation from bonds to equities and vice versa. Ben-Rephael et al. (2012) show that this aggregate sentiment proxy has a strong contemporaneous relation with stock market excess returns and VIX.
Summary statistics for the aggregate sentiment measures can be found in Table 1 . We observe that the BB-Sent is on average bullish, with a mean value of 0.139, while the SpecSent is on average slightly bearish, with a mean value of -0.045. Moreover, both the BB-Sent and the Spec-Sent are quite persistent with autocorrelation coe¢ cients of 0.746 and 0.817 respectively. In contrast, the Flow-Sent has an almost zero mean value and is much less persistent, with an autocorrelation coe¢ cient of 0.219. Figure 1 plots the three proxies from January 1990 to June 2011. We see that BB-Sent and Spec-Sent tend to move together in the …rst period but this pattern reverses in the second period. The Flow-Sent mostly follows the BB-Sent, especially during the second period. Moreover, comparing the plots of the aggregate sentiment proxies with that of the risk-neutral skewness, we observe that all sentiment proxies move similarly to the risk-neutral skewness in the …rst period. This is not the case in the second period.
The aforementioned relations are also con…rmed by the correlation coe¢ cients that are reported in Table 2 Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) . In order to estimate the economic fundamentals driving the sentiment measures, we estimate the following regression for each of the sentiment proxies:
where Sent it is the aggregate sentiment proxy i at time t, and z t is the vector of the macro- sentiment together with the macroeconomic variables. However, we prefer to follow the …rst approach since it is more widely used in the literature and the results can be more easily interpreted. Table 3 
Alternative Sentiment Decompositions
While our main sentiment decomposition is based on a set of eight indicators that represent eight major segments of the economy, it is possible that a broader range of variables is needed in order to capture all the macroeconomic information that drives investors'expectations.
Therefore, we also consider an alternative sentiment decomposition that makes use of our entire dataset of the 131 macroeconomic variables. This is of particular importance, since the key signaling variables that drive investor sentiment are unobserved. In order to utilize our full macroeconomic dataset, we create a set of latent common factors using the asymptotic in Appendix C). This way, each factor can be associated with one or more groups of macroeconomic variables. The …rst factor mostly loads on the variables of output, employment and orders, so it can be considered a real activity factor. The second factor loads heavily on price indices. The third factor is mostly associated with interest rate spreads, while the fourth factor is mostly correlated with inventories and consumption variables. The …fth factor loads mainly on output and stock market variables. The sixth factor is mainly related to interest rates and exchange rates. Finally, the seventh factor loads mainly on housing variables, while the eighth factor is mainly driven by money supply and bank reserves.
Since the estimated common factors summarize the information embedded in all 131
variables that constitute our macroeconomic dataset, it is likely that they also eclipse the idiosyncratic signal encapsulated in each variable. Another concern is the potential for look-ahead bias, given the fact that the construction of the factors requires the usage of data from the full sample period. Therefore, as a robustness check, we consider a third alternative sentiment decomposition that uses a selection of variables that are highly correlated with the common factors. In particular, for each factor we consider the three variables with the highest R 2 s and choose from those the one that is most important and widely used in the literature.
The variables we obtain following this approach are nonfarm payroll (Emp: total), Consumer
Price Index (CPI-U: all), term spread (10 yr-FF spread), inventories to sales ratio (M&T invent/sales), aggregate stock market momentum (S&P 500), Baa corporate bond yield (Baa bond), housing starts (Starts: nonfarm) and money supply M1 (M1). It is apparent that the information embedded in the aforementioned explanatory variables is similar to the information embedded in the variables used in the main sentiment decomposition, hence validating our initial selection. increases. The next variable is the options trading volume (TrVlm), which is considered as a proxy for dispersion in investors' beliefs (see Buraschi and Jiltsov, 2006) . In particular,
Control Variables
we take the natural logarithm of the detrended trading volume. Further, we include the contemporaneous volatility of the S&P 500 index (Vol) proxied by the VIX index, as it is considered the main determinant of risk-neutral skewness in stochastic volatility pricing models (e.g., Heston, 1993) and is also theoretically linked to skewness by BKM. 8 Summary statistics for the control variables can be found in Table 1 . RelDem has a mean value of 1,837 with a close to zero autocorrelation coe¢ cient, while TrVlm has a zero mean value due to the deterministic time trend adjustment and an autocorrelation coe¢ cient of 0.393. Vol has a mean value of 0.203 and is quite persistent, with an autocorrelation coe¢ cient of 0.861.
The correlation coe¢ cients between the control variables and risk-neutral skewness can be found in Table 2 . RelDem and TrVlm are negatively related to risk-neutral skewness in both periods (for RelDem the correlation is marginal in the …rst period) with coe¢ cients ranging from -0.01 to -0.26. The documented negative correlation for RelDem is in accordance with the limits to arbitrage hypothesis of Bollen and Whaley (2004) . Intuitively, a higher demand for OTM puts in relation to NTM options drives the prices of those contracts up because of the market makers'increased risk exposure and hedging costs. Furthermore, the documented negative correlation for TrVlm is in accordance with the heterogeneous agents model of Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) . Unlike the other two variables, Vol is negatively correlated with risk-neutral skewness during the …rst period (-0.25) but exhibits a positive correlation in the second period (0.24). 9 The documented negative correlation for Vol in the 8 Han (2008) considers stock market momentum as an additional control variable in his explanatory model. In our case, the information of momentum is embedded in the EF sentiment component. 9 Unlike our …nding, Han (2008) documents a positive relation between volatility and risk-neutral skewness for the period January 1988 -June 1997. However, the negative relation we …nd for the period January 1990 -June 1997 is driven only by the observations of year 1990. If we remove this year from our sample Vol exhibits a positive correlation of 0.19 with skewness. Since the correlation between the two variables appears to be very sensitive to the sample period considered, we attribute the di¤erence in results between our study and Han (2008) to the di¤erence in sample periods. We con…rm that the same relations between Vol and risk-neutral skewness hold if instead of our skewness estimates we use the CBOE SKEW index, available at http://www.cboe.com/micro/skew/introduction.aspx. …rst period is in accordance with the theoretical prediction of BKM in the presence of excess kurtosis in the physical density. The documented positive correlation for Vol in the second period is in line with stochastic volatility models, such as Heston (1993).
Empirical Analysis
This section explores the time-series relation between the investor sentiment measures and the skewness of the risk-neutral density of S&P 500 index returns. It is possible for sentiment to in ‡uence risk-neutral skewness, due to the existence of limits to arbitrage in the options market (Han, 2008) . In particular, a bearish or bullish sentiment creates demand for a speci…c class of options (e.g. OTM puts). As market makers satisfy this demand they face more di¢ culty in hedging their positions and therefore charge higher prices. From their point of view, investors are willing to accept these higher prices due to their sentiment. Hence, we observe changes in the shape of the risk-neutral distribution and implicitly in the pricing kernel.
In this vein, we examine the relation of the risk-neutral skewness …rstly with the aggregate sentiment and then with the two distinct sentiment components, EF and EB. Subsequently, we investigate whether the risk-neutral skewness is a¤ected by the EF component asymmetrically during periods of positive and negative stock market conditions and periods of more bullish and more bearish EF component. Finally, we examine whether there is a di¤erential impact of the two sentiment components on slope measures of the implied volatility smirk created separately by call and put options. We conduct our analysis over two periods -the …rst dating from January 1990 to June 1997 and the second from July 1997 to June 2011. This enables us to compare out …ndings to those of Han (2008) , whose sample period ends at June 1997. Further, we are also able to take into account the possible structural change in the S&P 500 index options market due to the introduction of the E-mini contracts and the Dow-Jones options in 1997. Table 4 shows the results of regressing S&P 500 index risk-neutral skewness on the three aggregate sentiment measures used in the study. The results in Panel B are intriguing, as they show that the previous pattern changes substantially in the second period. In particular, all three aggregate sentiment proxies become negative, with BB-Sent and Flow-Sent being also signi…cant. However, these turn insigni…cant once the control variables are included into the explanatory model. Apparently, in the second period there is no considerable relationship between risk-neutral skewness and aggregate sentiment. A possible explanation for the results in Panel B is that in the second period the market makers are willing to provide liquidity to investors at lower prices than those that the investors are willing to accept when their sentiment is either low or high. In the same vein, Han (2008) asserts that the risk-neutral skewness and sentiment relation is much weaker in periods of low limits to arbitrage. Another possible explanation, however, which will be examined in the next section, is that the aggregate sentiment constitutes a noisy aggregation of the rational expectation and erroneous belief components, that can separately a¤ect the risk-neutral skewness.
Risk-Neutral Skewness and Aggregate Sentiment
Regarding the control variables, they are insigni…cant in the …rst period and while mainly negative, they turn positive in a few cases. In the second period, the picture is clearer, with RelDem and TrVlm being consistently negative and Vol being consistently positive.
Furthermore, the results for TrVlm and Vol are signi…cant in all but one case (Vol for the BB-Sent). These relations are in line with the correlations between the control variables and risk-neutral skewness described in the previous section.
Summarizing the above mentioned empirical evidence, we …nd that aggregate sentiment plays an important role in determining the level of risk-neutral skewness only in the period January 1990 to June 1997. More speci…cally, aggregate sentiment is positively related to risk-neutral skewness, implying that a more bearish (bullish) investor sentiment leads to a more (less) negatively sloped pricing kernel. In the second and most recent period, July 1997 to June 2011, there is no signi…cant relation for aggregate sentiment once we control for relative demand pressure, heterogeneity in beliefs and contemporaneous volatility.
Risk-Neutral Skewness and Sentiment Components
Previous literature documents that the variation in the risk-neutral skewness is mainly driven by changes in the slope of the pricing kernel due to the approximately symmetric conditional physical probability distribution (Ait-Sahalia et al., 2001 and Rosenberg and Engle, 2002). Shefrin (2005) asserts that the pricing kernel can be decomposed into two components: one component that is driven by investors'rational expectations about future consumption and a second component that stems from investors' erroneous beliefs. In accordance with Shefrin's model, in Section 2.3 we decomposed aggregate investor sentiment into economic fundamentals and error in beliefs components. In light of this, the main aim of this section is to examine which part of sentiment drives the time-series variation in the index risk-neutral skewness. In doing so, we will gain useful insights about the way the economic fundamentals and error in beliefs components a¤ect index option prices and the pricing kernel.
If aggregate sentiment has a signi…cant impact on risk-neutral skewness, this can originate from the EF component, the EB component or a combination of both. In that respect, the analysis of the …rst period will allow us to draw inferences about the source of the positive relationship between risk-neutral skewness and investor sentiment documented by Han (2008) and also con…rmed in the previous section. Han (2008) conjectures that this relation stems from investors'erroneous expectations, and his assumption is reinforced by the fact that the main results of his study do not change after controlling for four popular macroeconomic indicators. Our empirical analysis seeks to scrutinize Han's assumption by examining which of the two sentiment components actually a¤ects risk-neutral skewness and hence the pricing kernel.
If aggregate sentiment does not signi…cantly a¤ect risk-neutral skewness, as in the second period, this does not necessarily mean that no component a¤ects it. In fact it is possible that one (or even both) of the two components has a signi…cant impact on skewness, which vanishes when we sum the two components into an aggregate sentiment. In that respect, the analysis of the second period will allow us to investigate whether either of the two separate sentiment components in ‡uences risk-neutral skewness. We hypothesize that if the market matures with time, it is more likely that the EF component will be signi…cant. If no component turns out to be signi…cant, this …nding will imply either that there are no limits to arbitrage in the index options market or that the information embedded in sentiment is subsumed by some of the control variables.
The results from regressing risk-neutral skewness on both parts of each sentiment proxy following the main decomposition are reported in Table 5 Turning to the control variables, the results are qualitatively similar to those presented in the previous section, with the exception of Vol in the second period, which is now positively but insigni…cantly related to risk-neutral skewness. This implies that the information embedded in Vol for skewness is subsumed by the EF component of all three sentiment proxies.
In essence, the explanatory power of stock market volatility for risk-neutral skewness stems from the fact that they are both related to economic fundamentals. In fact, the correlation of Vol with the EF component of BB-Sent, Spec-Sent and Flow-Sent is -0.61, 0.33 and -0.53 respectively. Table 6 presents the results from regressing risk-neutral skewness on the sentiment components following the decomposition based on the common factors. It can be seen that the results are qualitatively similar to those from Table 5 , but the EF component is slightly less signi…cant in all cases, apart from the case of Spec-Sent in the …rst period. Furthermore, the regression R 2 s in the second period are always lower or equal to the respective R 2 s presented in Table 5 . This empirical evidence implies that at least in the second period, the idiosyncratic component of various major economic indicators is important for explaining the risk-neutral skewness with economic fundamentals. The results from regressing skewness on the sentiment components following the decomposition based on the alternative selection of macroeconomic variables are qualitatively and quantitatively almost identical to those presented in Table 5 and thus omitted for brevity.
In summary, this section shows that the signi…cant relationship between risk-neutral skewness and aggregate sentiment in the …rst period stems mainly from the EF sentiment component but the EB component exhibits also some explanatory power. In the second period, the explanatory power of the EB component vanishes and only the EF component has a signi…cant impact on skewness. Moreover, the relation indicates that index options traders expect on average a reversal of recent economic conditions. Finally, there is evidence that the EF sentiment component captures additional information to that captured by stock market volatility.
Risk-Neutral Skewness and Sentiment Components in Di¤er-ent Economic Conditions
The empirical evidence presented in the previous section establishes a strong link between the EF sentiment component and the S&P 500 index risk-neutral skewness. It is possible, however, that investors in the index options market react di¤erently to worsened than to improved economic conditions. Therefore, the aim of this section is to investigate whether the documented relation between the EF component and risk-neutral skewness exhibits an asymmetric pattern depending on the recent economic conditions and subsequently on whether the EF component becomes more bullish or bearish. To this end, we repeat the analysis of Section 3.2, investigating separately months of improved and deteriorating stock market momentum and months of increased and decreased EF sentiment component. In particular, we create dummy variables based on whether the stock market momentum and the EF component increase or decrease relative to the value of the previous month. These dummy variables are used as interaction terms for all the regressors except for the lagged dependent variable. Due to the relatively low number of observations in the …rst period we conduct this analysis only for the second period. Therefore, it is apparent that the strong relation between risk-neutral skewness and the EF component documented in the previous section is mainly driven by the periods of worsened stock market conditions, which lead to a less negative risk-neutral skewness since on average index options investors anticipate a reversal. Table   7 . The coe¢ cients of the BB-Sent and Flow-Sent (Spec-Sent) EF component are much higher and much more signi…cant when there is a decrease (increase) in the EF component relative to its previous value than when there is an increase (decrease) relative to its previous value.
Turning to the control variables, it is interesting to note that RelDem and Vol mainly a¤ect risk-neutral skewness in periods of declined stock market conditions, while the impact of TrVlm mostly comes from periods of improved stock market conditions.
Overall, the empirical evidence of this section reveals that, while after June 1997 investors in the S&P 500 index options market trade on average based on their expectations about a reversal of the economy, this is more pronounced when recent stock market conditions deteriorate. In particular, a decreased stock market momentum leads to a more bearish (bullish) BB-Sent and Flow-Sent (Spec-Sent) and a less negative risk-neutral skewness. The opposite relation does not appear to be signi…cant.
Slope Measures from Calls and Puts and Sentiment Components
The empirical analysis of this section investigates whether the EF and EB sentiment com- index risk-neutral skewness is mainly driven by investors'reversal expectations. Since the negative risk-neutral skewness is mainly caused by the high prices of OTM puts (Rubinstein, 1994, Jackwerth and Rubinstein, 1996), we expect to …nd that the same relation holds for the skewness proxy extracted from put options as well. On the contrary, if call and put options markets are indeed segmented, we hypothesize that the same relation does not hold for the skewness proxy extracted from call options.
To investigate the possibility of a di¤erential impact of the two sentiment components on call and put options prices, we construct for each type of options two measures of the slope of the respective implied volatility smirk. In particular, for each cross-section of either calls or puts we interpolate implied volatilities into the range of available options data using a smoothing cubic spline and extrapolate outside this range using the respective boundary values. Then for call options we create the following slope measures capturing the di¤erence in implied volatilities between OTM and deep-out-of-the-money (DOTM) calls and at-the-money (ATM) and DOTM calls:
where IV DOT M , IV OT M and IV AT M are the implied volatilities of call options corresponding to K=S = 1:125, K=S = 1:075 and K=S = 1 respectively. Similarly, for puts we create the following slope measures capturing the di¤erence in implied volatilities between DOTM and OTM puts and DOTM and ATM puts:
where IV DOT M , IV OT M and IV AT M are the implied volatilities corresponding to K=S = 0:875, K=S = 0:925 and K=S = 1 respectively. If for a given cross-section two or more of the desired moneynesses are outside the range of available options data, then this cross-section is discarded. We estimate the slope measures on the last trading day of the month for the two time horizons that are nearest to one month and interpolate to …nd the exact onemonth-ahead slope measures for calls and puts markets. We investigate only the second part of our sample period, as in the …rst part, the liquidity of high-moneyness calls is quite low and there are many days for which we cannot estimate the slopes measures for call options. The summary statistics of the above variables can be found in Table 1 
Conclusion
In this paper, we decompose aggregate investor sentiment into two parts -one part that is driven by economic fundamentals (EF) and represents investors'rational updating of beliefs about future returns, and a second part that is unrelated to fundamentals and represents errors in investors'beliefs (EB) in the form of unjusti…ed pessimism or optimism. The main aim of this study is to examine how the rational and the irrational components of investor sentiment drive the variations in risk-neutral skewness and hence the pricing kernel.
We estimate the EF component using a parsimonious set of variables that re ‡ect the information embedded in eight main macroeconomic categories. In this way we take into investors'rational updating of beliefs. Therefore, incorporating investors'irrationality into sophisticated option pricing models not longer appears to be valuable, at least for mature options markets such as S&P 500 index options market. In contrast, it is likely that investors' erroneous beliefs are still an important determinant of the pricing kernel in less developed or emerging markets, so further research is needed to examine this possibility.
A Calculation of Risk-Neutral Skewness
The following formulas are provided by Bakshi, Kapadia and Madan (2003) and are reproduced here for completeness. For further details the reader should refer to the original paper. Let S (t) be the stock price at time t, its continuously compounded return over the period t + , R (t; ) is given by:
The risk-neutral skewness of the stock's return over the period [t; t + ] can be found by:
Skew(t; ) = e r W (t; ) 3 (t; )e r V (t; ) + 2 (t; )
where
represent the fair value of a volatility, cubic and quartic contract respectively and
denotes the mean logarithmic return of the stock over the period t + . The risk-free rate is r. The prices of the above contracts can be estimated as weighted sums of OTM call C(t; ; K) and put P (t; ; K) option prices with time to maturity and strike price K:
B Description of Macroeconomic Dataset 
C Estimation of Common Factors
Before proceeding to the common factors estimation, all the data are transformed appropriately in order to become stationary and are standardized. The procedure we follow for the estimation of the pervasive macroeconomic factors is the asymptotic principal component analysis (APCA) introduced by Connor and Korajczyk (1986) and widely used for summarizing latent information from large macroeconomic panels. Let N be the number of observed variables, T the number of time series observations and K the number of latent common factors. For i = 1; :::; N , t = 1; :::; T; and assuming a static factor model with approximate structure, a variable x it can be written as:
where x it is the variable i at time t, ik is the factor loading of variable i corresponding to the k th factor, f kt is the value of the k th factor at time t and e it is the idiosyncratic error of variable i at time t. The T K factor matrix b F is calculated as p T multiplied by the eigenvectors corresponding to the …rst K eigenvalues of the T T matrix XX 0 . The normalization F 0 F=T = I gives the solution for the factor loadings matrix as b 0 = b F 0 X=T . The number of signi…cant factors r is speci…ed by minimizing the IC 2 information criterion as suggested by Bai and Ng (2002) :
where Vol is the index instantaneous volatility as proxied by VIX. BB-Sent is the bull-bear spread based on Investors Intelligence's advisors sentiment index. Spec-Sent is the net position of non-commercial traders on S&P 500 index futures scaled by the total open interest. Flow-Sent is the normalized aggregate net exchanges of the equity funds. EF and EB are the two components of each sentiment proxy estimated as described in Section 2.3. Newey-West t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coe¢ cients. ***, ** and * denote signi…cance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. TrVlm is the heterogeneity of beliefs, proxied by the detrended logarithm of options trading volume. Vol is the index instantaneous volatility as proxied by VIX. BB-Sent is the bull-bear spread based on Investors Intelligence's advisors sentiment index. Spec-Sent is the net position of non-commercial traders on S&P 500 index futures scaled by the total open interest. Flow-Sent is the normalized aggregate net exchanges of the equity funds. EF and EB are the two components of each sentiment proxy estimated using APCA as described in Section 2.3. Newey-West t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coe¢ cients. ***, ** and * denote signi…cance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. Vol is the index instantaneous volatility as proxied by VIX. BB-Sent is the bull-bear spread based on Investors Intelligence's advisors sentiment index. Spec-Sent is the net position of non-commercial traders on S&P 500 index futures scaled by the total open interest. FlowSent is the normalized aggregate net exchanges of the equity funds. EF and EB are the two components of each sentiment proxy estimated as described in Section 2.3. Newey-West tstatistics are reported in parentheses below the coe¢ cients. ***, ** and * denote signi…cance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. TrVlm is the heterogeneity of beliefs, proxied by the detrended logarithm of options trading volume. Vol is the index instantaneous volatility as proxied by VIX. BB-Sent is the bull-bear spread based on Investors Intelligence's advisors sentiment index. Spec-Sent is the net position of non-commercial traders on S&P 500 index futures scaled by the total open interest. Flow-Sent is the normalized aggregate net exchanges of the equity funds. EF and EB are the two components of each sentiment proxy estimated as described in Section 2.3. Newey-West t-statistics are reported in parentheses below the coe¢ cients. ***, ** and * denote signi…cance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively.
